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PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
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Administrator of the US Airways, Inc. Employee Benefits
Plan
v.
JAMES E. MCCUTCHEN; ROSEN LOUIK & PERRY,
P.C.,
Appellants
_____________
On Appeal from the District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(No. 2-08-cv-01593)
District Judge: Honorable David Stewart Cercone
Argued July 11, 2011
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and VANASKIE, Circuit
Judges
(Opinion Filed: November 16, 2011)
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OPINION OF THE COURT

FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
After Appellant James McCutchen suffered a serious
automobile accident, a benefit plan administered by US
Airways paid $66,866 for his medical expenses. McCutchen
then recovered $110,000 from third parties, with the
assistance of counsel. Then US Airways, which had not
sought to enforce its subrogation rights, demanded
reimbursement of the entire $66,866 it had paid without
allowance for McCutchen’s legal costs, which had reduced
his net recovery to less than the amount it demanded. US
Airways filed this suit against McCutchen for “appropriate
equitable relief” pursuant to § 502(a)(3) of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B). The issue before us is
whether McCutchen may assert certain equitable limitations,
such as unjust enrichment, on US Airways’ equitable claim.
We conclude that he may. We therefore vacate the District
Court’s order requiring McCutchen to pay US Airways the
entire $66,866 and remand the case for that Court to fashion
“appropriate equitable relief.”
I.
This case stems from a tragic car accident in which a
young driver lost control of her car, crossed the median of the
road, and struck a car driven by 51-year-old James
McCutchen. Then the truck traveling behind McCutchen also
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slammed into his car. The accident killed one person and left
two others with severe brain injuries. McCutchen himself
was grievously injured and survived only after emergency
surgery. He spent several months in physical therapy and
ultimately underwent a complete hip replacement. Since the
accident, McCutchen, who had a history of back surgeries and
associated chronic pain, has also become unable to effectively
treat that pain with medication. The accident has rendered
him functionally disabled. McCutchen’s Health Benefit Plan
(the “Plan”), administered and self-financed by US Airways,
paid medical expenses in the amount of $66,866 on his
behalf.
After the accident, McCutchen, through his attorneys
at Rosen Louik & Perry, P.C., filed an action against the
driver of the car that caused the accident. Because she had
limited insurance coverage, and because three other people
were seriously injured or killed, McCutchen settled with the
other driver for only $10,000. However, with his lawyers’
assistance, he and his wife received another $100,000 in
underinsured motorist coverage for a total third-party
recovery of $110,000. After paying a 40% contingency
attorneys’ fee and expenses, his net recovery was less than
$66,000. US Airways demanded reimbursement for the
entire $66,866 that it had paid for McCutchen’s medical bills.
Soon after, Rosen Louik & Perry placed $41,500 in a trust
account, reasoning that any lien found to be valid would have
to be reduced by a proportional amount of legal costs. The
record on appeal does not establish what amount was
disbursed to McCutchen.
When McCutchen did not pay, US Airways, in its
capacity as administrator of the ERISA benefits plan, filed
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suit in the District Court under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, seeking
“appropriate equitable relief” in the form of a constructive
trust or an equitable lien on the $41,500 held in trust and the
remaining $25,366 personally from McCutchen.
The
Summary Plan Description describing the US Airways
benefits plan covering McCutchen contained the following
paragraph,
entitled
“Subrogation
and
Right
of
Reimbursement”:
The purpose of the Plan is to provide coverage
for qualified expenses that are not covered by a
third party. If the Plan pays benefits for any
claim you incur as the result of negligence,
willful misconduct, or other actions of a third
party, the Plan will be subrogated to all your
rights of recovery. You will be required to
reimburse the Plan for amounts paid for claims
out of any monies recovered from a third party,
including, but not limited to, your own
insurance company as the result of judgment,
settlement, or otherwise. In addition you will
be required to assist the administrator of the
Plan in enforcing these rights and may not
negotiate any agreements with a third party that
would undermine the subrogation rights of the
Plan.
(App. 117) (emphasis added).
Thus, under the Plan
Description, a beneficiary is required to reimburse the Plan
for any amounts it has paid out of any monies the beneficiary
recovers from a third party.
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US Airways claims that this language permits it to
recoup the $66,866 it provided for McCutchen’s medical care
out of the $110,000 total that he recovered regardless of his
legal costs. It argues that “[t]he Plan language specifically
authorized reimbursement in the amount of benefits paid, out
of any recovery.” (Appellee’s Br. at 15-16).
McCutchen says that it would be unfair and
inequitable to reimburse US Airways in full when he has not
been fully compensated for his injuries, including pain and
suffering. He argues that US Airways, which made no
contribution to his attorneys’ fees and expenses, would be
unjustly enriched if it were now permitted to recover from
him without any allowance for those costs, in essence to reap
what McCutchen has sown. Indeed, if legal costs are not
taken into account, US Airways will effectively be reaching
into its beneficiary’s pocket, putting him in a worse position
than if he had not pursued a third-party recovery at all.
Citing the Plan’s use of the language “any monies
recovered,” as well as our previous decisions, the District
Court rejected McCutchen’s arguments and granted summary
judgment to US Airways. The Court required McCutchen to
sign over the $41,500 held in trust and to pay $25,366 from
his own funds. McCutchen appeals. 1
1

The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1). We have
jurisdiction over McCutchen’s appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. “We exercise plenary review over a district court’s
summary judgment ruling.” Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se.
Pa. Transp. Auth., 635 F.3d 87, 92 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting
Melrose Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 387 (3d Cir.
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II.
A.
Congress designed ERISA to protect employee
pensions and benefits by providing pension insurance,
enumerating certain specific characteristics of pension and
benefit plans, and setting forth fiduciary duties for the
managers of both pension and nonpension plans. Varity
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996). The Supreme
Court has repeatedly observed that “ERISA is a
comprehensive and reticulated statute, the product of a decade
of congressional study of the Nation’s private employee
benefit system.” Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002) (quoting Mertens v.
Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Courts have therefore been reluctant to
tamper with its carefully crafted and detailed enforcement
scheme. Id. Under this scheme, Congress gave plan
beneficiaries greater rights than plan fiduciaries to enforce the
terms of a benefit plan. A beneficiary has a general right of
action “to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan.”
Knudson, 534 U.S. at 221 (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B)). By contrast, a fiduciary’s right to enforce
plan terms is governed by ERISA’s § 502(a)(3), which limits
the available relief to an injunction or “other appropriate
2010)). “Summary judgment is appropriate only where,
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . .
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Id. (quoting Melrose Inc., 613 F.3d at 387)).
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equitable relief.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3); Knudson, 534 U.S.
at 221; Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Servs., Inc., 547 U.S.
356, 361 (2006). It is under this provision that US Airways
seeks to enforce the Plan’s subrogation and reimbursement
provision against McCutchen.
The Supreme Court has explained that the modifier
“appropriate equitable relief” is not superfluous. Mertens,
508 U.S. at 257-58. Rather, “Congress’s choice to limit the
relief available under § 502(a)(3) to ‘equitable relief’ requires
us to recognize the difference between legal and equitable
forms of restitution.” Knudson, 534 U.S. at 218. Thus, the
Supreme Court has “interpreted the term ‘appropriate
equitable relief’ in § 502(a)(3) as referring to those categories
of relief that, traditionally speaking (i.e., prior to the merger
of law and equity) were typically available in equity.” Cigna
Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1878 (2011) (quoting
Sereboff, 534 U.S. at 361) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court has twice considered what this
limitation means in the context of a fiduciary’s action for
reimbursement from a beneficiary under an ERISA plan. In
Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, the
Court first considered whether an ERISA plan administrator’s
claim for reimbursement was equitable in nature. See 534
U.S. at 210-12. To decide this question, the Court examined
cases and secondary legal materials to determine whether the
relief would have been equitable “[i]n the days of the divided
bench.” Id. at 212. As the Court explained, one feature of
equitable restitution was that it sought to impose a
constructive trust or equitable lien on “particular funds or
property in the defendant’s possession.” Id. at 213. The
Court held that this requirement was not met in Knudson

8

because the funds to which the plan claimed an entitlement
had been placed in a “Special Needs Trust” under California
law. Id. at 214.
In Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., the
Court again considered an ERISA plan administrator’s claim
for reimbursement under the terms of the plan and
§ 502(a)(3). See 547 U.S. at 359. This time the plan
administrator was able to overcome the initial hurdle of
identifying specific funds within the beneficiary’s possession
and control. Id. at 362-63. Accordingly, the Court proceeded
to consider whether there was a basis in equity for the
administrator’s reimbursement claim. See id. at 363-64. It
held that the claim could be based on an equitable lien by
agreement. Id. at 364-65 (citing Barnes v. Alexander, 232
U.S. 117 (1914)). Such a lien is not subject to the asset
tracing requirements imposed on liens sought as a matter of
equitable restitution. Id. at 365. Nor is it inherently subject
to the particular equitable defenses that accompany a
freestanding action for equitable subrogation, which may only
be asserted after a victim has been made whole for his
injuries. Id. at 368. Thus, the Court held that the plan
administrator in Sereboff properly sought “equitable relief”
under § 502(a)(3). Id. at 369. However, it expressly reserved
decision on whether the term “appropriate,” which modifies
“equitable relief” in § 502(a)(3), would make equitable
principles and defenses applicable to a claim under that
section. Id. at 368 n.2.
This case squarely presents the question that Sereboff
left open: whether § 502(a)(3)’s requirement that equitable
relief be “appropriate” means that a fiduciary like US
Airways is limited in its recovery from a beneficiary like
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McCutchen by the equitable defenses and principles that were
“typically available in equity.”
B.
McCutchen argues that the phrase “appropriate
equitable relief” means more than just that the relief US
Airways seeks must be of an equitable type; courts must also
exercise their discretion to limit that relief to what is
“appropriate” under traditional equitable principles. In
particular, he argues that the principle of unjust enrichment
frames US Airways’ claim. We agree. 2
The Supreme Court reasoned in Knudson that
“‘equitable relief’ must mean something less than all relief.”
Knudson, 534 U.S. at 209 (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 258
n.8) (emphasis in original). Therefore, a fund administrator
seeking to enforce a plan’s reimbursement provision must
2

Before the District Court, McCutchen also argued for
application of the “make-whole” doctrine, which is an
equitable doctrine, applied in many states, that provides that
“the insured is entitled to be made whole before the insurer
recovers on its subrogation claim.” 16 Lee R. Russ in
conjunction with Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance
§ 223:133 (3d ed. 2011); see, e.g., Swanson v. Hartford Ins.
Co. of Midwest, 46 P.3d 584, 589 (Mont. 2002) (“[A]n
insured must be totally reimbursed for all losses as well as
costs, including attorney fees, involved in recovering those
losses before the insurer can exercise any right of
subrogation, regardless of any contract language providing to
the contrary.”) (internal quotation omitted). McCutchen does
not pursue this argument on appeal, and we do not address it.
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demonstrate that its claim to relief is equitable. Sereboff, 547
U.S. at 363. By the same logic, “appropriate equitable relief”
must be something less than all equitable relief. See Mertens,
508 U.S. at 258 (“We will not read the statute to render the
modifier superfluous.”). The word “appropriate” means
“specially suitable,” “belonging peculiarly [to],” or “attached
as an accessory possession.”
Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 106 (1993).
Remedies that
peculiarly belong to traditional categories of equitable relief
would typically have been defeated by equitable principles
and defenses.
Indeed, it would be strange for Congress to have
intended that relief under § 502(a)(3) be limited to traditional
equitable categories, but not limited by other equitable
doctrines and defenses that were traditionally applicable to
those categories. “[S]tatutory reference to [an equitable]
remedy must, absent other indication, be deemed to contain
the limitations upon its availability that equity typically
imposes.” Knudson, 534 U.S. at 211 n.1 (rejecting the
argument that a reimbursement claim framed as a claim for
injunctive relief could proceed under § 502(a)(3) without a
showing that the relief sought was typically available in
equity); see also Cigna, 131 S. Ct. at 1880 (“Section
502(a)(3) invokes the equitable powers of the District
Court.”). Accordingly, in light of the foregoing reasoning,
and in the absence of any indication in the language or
structure of § 502(a)(3) to the contrary, we find that Congress
intended to limit the equitable relief available under
§ 502(a)(3) through the application of equitable defenses and
principles that were typically available in equity.
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To determine what types of relief were typically
available in equity, the Supreme Court endorsed consultation
of “standard current works such as Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin,
and the Restatements, which make the answer clear.”
Knudson, 534 U.S. at 217; see Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 368
(citing 4 George Palmer, Law of Restitution § 23.18 (1978)).
We consult the same works to determine whether that
equitable relief is “appropriate” in light of equitable
principles and defenses that were typically applied. These
sources all support McCutchen’s position that the principle of
unjust enrichment is broadly applicable to claims for
equitable relief. See 1 Dan Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.3(3),
at 602 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that equitable remedies such as
constructive trusts and equitable liens are all “invoked for the
same reason, to prevent unjust enrichment”); 1 Palmer, Law
of Restitution § 1.1, at 4 (“In equity the principal remedy is
constructive trust; but equitable lien, subrogation, and
accounting are techniques frequently used to prevent unjust
enrichment.”). This animating principle of equity clearly
applies to a trustee’s claim for reimbursement from its
beneficiary. “Equity courts possessed the power . . . to
prevent [a] trustee’s unjust enrichment.” Cigna, 131 S. Ct. at
1880 (citing Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 95, and
Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 5, Mar. 2, 2009)); see also 4
Palmer, Law of Restitution § 23.18 at 472-74 (“[T]he
principle of unjust enrichment . . . . should serve to limit the
effectiveness of contract provisions which in terms provide
for reimbursement out of the insured’s tort recovery without
regard to whether or the extent to which, that recovery
includes medical expense.”).
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C.
Against this conclusion, US Airways cites to prior
decisions of this Court in which we declined to fashion a
federal common law rule limiting an ERISA plan
administrator’s right to reimbursement under the plan’s terms.
See Ryan ex rel. Capria-Ryan v. Fed. Express, 78 F.3d 123
(3d Cir. 1996); Bollman Hat Co. v. Root, 112 F.3d 113 (3d
Cir. 1997); see also Bill Gray Enterprise v. Gourley, 248 F.3d
206, 220 n.13 (3d Cir. 2001). While we recognize that the
District Court may have considered itself bound by these
cases, each came before the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Knudson and Sereboff, which clarified the meaning of
“appropriate equitable relief” in § 502(a)(3), specified its
central importance to fiduciaries’ reimbursement suits under
ERISA, and thereby undermined the reasoning and holdings
of our prior decisions. Our prior opinions in Ryan, Bollman
Hat, and Gourley did not consider whether the phrase
“appropriate equitable relief” in § 502(a)(3) limits a
fiduciary’s right to relief. In fact, none of these cases even
referenced § 502(a)(3). These cases are therefore inapposite
in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decisions. See In
re Krebs, 527 F.3d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2008) (“A panel of this
Court may reevaluate the holding of a prior panel which
conflicts with intervening Supreme Court precedent.”); see
also Gately v. Mass., 2 F.3d 1221, 1226 (1st Cir. 1993)
(noting that under “[t]he essential principles of stare
decisis . . . if an issue is not argued, or though argued is
ignored by the court . . . the decision does not constitute a
precedent to be followed”). 3
3

Even under our prior cases, US Airways’ claim to
reimbursement from McCutchen’s pocket is unprecedented.
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US Airways next cites cases from other Courts of
Appeals, some of which were decided after Sereboff, to
support its position that equitable doctrines that might limit its
reimbursement recovery are not applicable under § 502(a)(3).
See Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. O’Hara, 604 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir.
2010); Admin. Comm. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assoc. Health
& Welfare Plan v. Shank, 500 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2007);
Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v.
Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2003);
Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health
& Welfare Plan v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2003). Like
our pre-Sereboff decisions, these cases frame the question of
whether equitable principles limit the scope of an
administrator’s right to reimbursement as a question of
whether federal common law can override the express
language of benefit plans. See, e.g., O’Hara, 604 F.3d at
1237 (“Applying federal common law to override the Plan’s
controlling language, which expressly provides for
reimbursement regardless of whether [insured] was made
whole . . . would frustrate, rather than effectuate ERISA’s . . .
We declined to pass on the permissibility of such a claim in
Bollman Hat, where amicus contended that mechanically
enforcing a plan’s reimbursement terms “will lead to
inequitable results where a plan participant’s third party
recovery is less than the plan’s subrogation claim plus
attorney’s fees.” 112 F.3d at 117. Because the participant’s
third party settlement fully financed his attorney’s fees and
the reimbursement claim in that case, we declined to address
“hypothetical scenarios.” Id.; see also Ryan, 78 F.3d at 12425 (noting that plan’s terms limited reimbursement to a
beneficiary’s net recovery after legal expenses).
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purpose to protect contractually defined benefits”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Shank, 500 F.3d at 837 (“We are
not persuaded that the Committee’s full recovery according to
the terms of the plan is not ‘appropriate’ relief within the
meaning of ERISA” because “we generally adopt new rules
of federal common law only if they are necessary to fill gaps
left by the express provisions of ERISA and to effectuate the
purposes of the statute.”); cf. Ryan, 78 F.3d at 127 (refusing
to recognize a new federal “common law right” under
ERISA). Because “[a]mong the primary purposes of ERISA
is to ensure the integrity of written plans,” these courts
refused to “apply common law theories to alter the express
terms of a written plan.” Shank, 500 F.3d at 838.
We disagree with those circuits that have held that it
would be pioneering federal common law to apply equitable
limitations on an equitable claim. Congress purposefully
limited the relief available to fiduciaries under § 503(a)(3) to
“appropriate equitable relief.” See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 209.
While our sister circuits pay homage to this language, they
appear to reason that its requirement has been met so long as
the suit can be properly characterized as an equitable action,
without also asking whether the relief sought in the action is
“appropriate” under traditional equitable principles and
doctrines. But the Supreme Court has rejected a permissive
reading of this language that would mean “all relief available
for breach of trust at common law” because “[t]he authority
of courts to develop a ‘federal common law’ under ERISA is
not the authority to revise the text of the statute.” Mertens,
508 U.S. at 258-59 (citation omitted). By categorically
excluding the equitable limitations that § 502(a)(3)’s
reference to equitable remedies necessarily contains, the
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Shank and O’Hara courts depart from the text of ERISA. See
Knudson, 534 U.S. at 211 n.1.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court recently
demonstrated in Cigna, the importance of the written benefit
plan is not inviolable, but is subject—based upon equitable
doctrines and principles—to modification and, indeed, even
equitable reformation under § 502(a)(3). 131 S. Ct. at 1879
(finding that the District Court’s “reformation of the terms of
the plan, in order to remedy the false or misleading
information CIGNA provided . . . . [was within] a traditional
power of an equity court”). While the basis for the
reformation in Cigna was intentional misrepresentations by
the employer and fiduciary, the broader and more relevant
point is that when courts were sitting in equity in the days of
the divided bench (or even when they apply equitable
principles today) contractual language was not as sacrosanct
as it is normally considered to be when applying breach of
contract principles at common law. We do not suggest that
US Airways’ conduct was fraudulent or dishonest in the way
that Cigna’s was, but equitable principles can apply even
where no one has committed a wrong.
Thus, we agree that one of Congress’s purposes in
enacting ERISA was to “ensure the integrity of written,
bargained-for benefit plans.’” O’Hara, 604 F.3d at 1236.
But, as demonstrated by the language of § 502(a)(3) and now
Cigna, Congress expressly tempered that purpose by limiting
fiduciaries to “appropriate equitable relief,” thus invoking
principles that it surely knew are sometimes less deferential to
absolute freedom of contract. In other words, “vague notions
of a statute’s ‘basic purpose’ are . . . inadequate to overcome
the words of its text regarding the specific issue under
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consideration.” Knudson, 534 U.S. at 220 (quoting Mertens,
508 U.S. at 261) (emphasis in original).
Finally, US Airways raises a practical concern that the
application of equitable principles will increase plan costs and
premiums. This concern does not address the statutory
language and is, in any event, unsubstantiated by the
circumstances of this case. US Airways cannot plausibly
claim it charged lower premiums because it anticipated a
windfall.
D.
Applying the traditional equitable principle of unjust
enrichment, we conclude that the judgment requiring
McCutchen to provide full reimbursement to US Airways
constitutes inappropriate and inequitable relief. Because the
amount of the judgment exceeds the net amount of
McCutchen’s third-party recovery, it leaves him with less
than full payment for his emergency medical bills, thus
undermining the entire purpose of the Plan. At the same time,
it amounts to a windfall for US Airways, which did not
exercise its subrogation rights or contribute to the cost of
obtaining the third-party recovery. Equity abhors a windfall.
See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. S.S. American Lancer,
870 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1989).
Therefore, we will vacate the District Court’s final
judgment. We do not decide on appeal what would constitute
appropriate equitable relief for US Airways because “equity
calls for full factual findings rather than our speculation.”
Nat’l City Mortg. Co. v. Stephen, 647 F.3d 78, 87 n.8 (3d Cir.
2011); see also, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329
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(1944) (“The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the
power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each
decree to the necessities of the particular case.”); see
generally Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2563 (2010)
(discussing the bounded flexibility of courts of equity).
Instead, we will remand for the District Court to “exercise its
discretion under § 502(a)(3).” Cigna, 131 S. Ct. at 1880.
On remand, the District Court should engage in any
additional fact-finding it finds necessary. In addition to the
considerations discussed above, factors such as the
distribution of the third-party recovery between McCutchen
and his attorneys at Rosen Louik & Perry, the nature of their
agreement, the work performed, and the allocation of costs
and risks between the parties to this suit may inform the
Court’s exercise of its discretion to fashion “appropriate
equitable relief.”
III.
Because we conclude that US Airways’ claim for
reimbursement under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA is subject to
equitable limitations, we will vacate the District Court’s final
judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
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